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Abstract. Nominal GDP targeting has been advocated by a number of
authors since it produces relative stability of in￿ation and output. However, all of
the papers assume rational expectations on the part of private agents. In this paper
I provide an analysis of this assumption. I use stability under recursive learning as a
criterion for evaluating nominal GDP targeting in the context of a model with explicit
micro-foundations which is currently the workhorse for the analysis of monetary
policy. The results of the paper provide support for such a monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
Monetary policy rules that utilize as their principal target variable the level or growth
rate of some aggregate measure of nominal spending, such as nominal GDP, have had
considerable academic support since the early 1980s. More recently, arguments in favor of
nominal GDP targeting have also been made, among others, by Hall and Mankiw (1994),
Frankel and Chinn (1995), McCallum (1997c) and McCallum and Nelson (1999a) (see Hall
and Mankiw (1994) and McCallum and Nelson (1999a) for a more extensive discussion
of this literature). Nominal output targeting has two desirable features as a strategy for
monetary policy. First, it automatically takes into account movements in both prices
and real output, which in practice are the two variables central banks care about most.
Second, nominal GDP can serve as a long-run nominal anchor for monetary policy given
the common belief that monetary policy can not aﬀect the real economy in the long-run.
Rudebusch (2000) points out that two distinct developments have also boosted an in-
terest in nominal GDP targeting in recent years. The formation of the European Central
Bank (ECB) in Europe has encouraged a lively debate about the appropriate strategy for
European monetary policy. The announced ECB strategy contains an element of mone-
tary targeting which is closely related to nominal output targeting if there are no large
shifts in monetary velocity. In fact, the ECB (1999) has explicitly derived its 4.5% ref-
erence value for M3 growth from a desired growth rate for nominal output. The ECB￿s
announced monetary strategy, therefore, provides support for the consideration of nom-
inal output targeting. The second development which has increased interest in nominal
GDP targeting has been the behavior of the U.S. economy in recent years. A number of
macroeconomic forecasters have been making forecasting errors- both overpredicting in￿a-
tion and underpredicting output growth ( see, for instance, Figure 1 of Brayton, Roberts,
and Williams (1999)). In light of this uncertainty about the level of potential output and
the dynamics of the U.S. economy, several authors like McCallum (1999) and Orphanides
(2000) suggest that monetary policy should focus on nominal GDP growth.
In this paper I study the desirability of nominal GDP targeting in the context of
a standard forward looking model which is currently the workhorse in the analysis ofDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 2
monetary policy. I use the ￿New Phillips curve￿ model which has explicit micro-economic
foundations and has been derived in a number of papers and reviewed, for instance, in
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999). I ￿rst show that a monetary policy
of targeting the growth rate of nominal income generically yields a unique equilibrium
when the private sector has rational expectations of in￿ation and output. Such a question
is of utmost importance since it is well known since the paper of Sargent and Wallace
(1975) that uniqueness of equilibrium can not be taken for granted in such models. This
question takes added importance in the context of nominal GDP targeting since Ball
(1999) has argued that this policy would be destabilizing for output and in￿ation.
The novel contribution of this paper, however, comes from a diﬀerent angle. Almost
the entire literature of targeting nominal GDP has assumed rational expectations on the
part of economic agents. By now it is well known that this assumption need neither
be innocuous nor realistic. Agents are somehow assumed to be able to coordinate on a
particular rational expectations equilibrium (REE). However, it is not obvious whether
or how such coordination may arise. In order to complete such an argument, one needs
to show the potential for agents to learn the equilibrium of the model being analyzed. An
early instance where this was emphasized was Howitt (1992) who showed the instability
under learning of interest rate pegging and related rules in ￿exible price and ad hoc IS-
LM type models. In his conclusion he explicitly warned that, in general, any rational
expectations analysis of monetary policy should be supplemented with an investigation of
its stability under learning. He emphasized that the assumption of rational expectations
(RE) can be quite misleading in the context of a ￿xed monetary regime- if the regime
is not conducive to learnability, then the consequences can be quite diﬀerent from those
predicted under rational expectations.
Surely, expectational errors may arise in practice from changes in the economic struc-
ture or in the practices of policymakers. The assumption that agents somehow have
rational expectations immediately after such changes is clearly very strong and need not
be correct empirically. The learning analysis, on the other hand, allows for the possibility
that expectations might not be initially fully rational, and that, if agents make forecastDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 3
errors and try to correct them over time, the economy may or may not converge to the
rational expectations equilibrium asymptotically. The purpose of this paper is to conduct
such an analysis in the context of nominal GDP targeting. This has the potential to
determine whether or not the particular rational expectations equilibrium can ever be ob-
served. Bullard and Mitra (2000) recently used learning to evaluate monetary policy rules
where the interest rate responds to measures of in￿ation and output gap- rules which have
been popularized since Taylor￿s (1993) seminal contribution. They show that if agents are
assumed to follow adaptive learning rules, then the stability of these Taylor-type mon-
etary policy rules can not be taken for granted even in cases when the economy has a
determinate equilibrium under rational expectations.
The central result of the paper is that a particular policy of targeting nominal GDP is
stable under learning dynamics for all possible parametrizations of the model. This is a
policy where the central bank bases the nominal interest rate directly on the expectations
of private agents. In such a scenario, agents using adaptive learning mechanisms are
indeed able to coordinate on the particular equilibrium under consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic model which will
be analyzed for determinacy and learnability in section 3 under a monetary policy of
targeting the growth rate of nominal GDP. An important weakness of the basic model
presented in section 2 is that there are no backward looking elements- consequently, such a
model does not capture the persistence in output and in￿ation commonly observed in the
data. Section 4 recti￿es this defect and analyzes nominal GDP targeting in a model with
endogenous output and in￿ation persistence. The analysis suggests that the desirability
of GDP targeting is essentially unaﬀe c t e dw i t ht h i se x t e n s i o n .
2. The Model
I study a small forward-looking macroeconomic model recently analyzed in Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999) which is currently the workhorse for the theoretical analysis of mone-
tary policy (see, for example, McCallum and Nelson (1999b), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999)). It is a dynamic general equilibrium model with temporary nominal price rigidi-
ties. Within the model, monetary policy aﬀects the real economy in the short run, asDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 4
in the traditional IS/LM model. A key diﬀerence from the traditional IS/LM model,
however, is that the aggregate behavioral equations evolve explicitly from optimization
by households and ￿rms.




it − ￿ Etπt+1
·
+ ￿ Etxt+1 + gt (1)
πt = λxt +β ￿ Etπt+1 + ut (2)
where xt is the ￿output gap￿ i.e. the diﬀerence between actual and potential output,
πt is the period t in￿ation rate de￿ned as the percentage change in the price level from
t − 1 to t,a n dit is the nominal interest rate; each variable is expressed as a deviation
from its long run level. Since our main focus will be on an analysis of learning we use the
notation ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1 to denote the possibly (subjective) private sector expectations
of in￿ation and output gap next period, respectively, whereas the same notation without
the ￿^￿ superscript will denote the rational expectations (RE) values.
Equation (1) is the intertemporal IS equation whereas equation (2) is the aggregate
supply equation. The IS equation (1) can be derived from log-linearizing the Euler equa-
tion associated with the household￿s saving decision. The aggregate supply equation (the
￿new Phillips￿ curve) (2) can be derived from optimal pricing decisions of monopolistically
competitive ￿rms facing constraints on the frequency of future price changes. The param-
eters ϕ, λ, and β are structural and are assumed to be positive on economic grounds. In
particular, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and the interest elasticity of the IS curve, ϕ,
corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. The slope of
the Phillips curve, λ, depends on the average frequency of price changes and the elasticity
of demand faced by suppliers of goods. Prices are more nearly ￿exible the higher is λ.
Finally, the demand shock gt and the cost push shock ut are assumed to follow ￿rst order
autoregressive processes:
gt = ￿gt−1 +￿ gt (3)
ut = ρut−1 +￿ ut (4)Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 5
where 0 <￿ ,ρ < 1 and where both ￿ gt and ￿ ut are iid noise with zero means and variances
σ2
g and σ2
u, respectively. The model is closed by assuming that the nominal interest rate
it is the instrument of monetary policy.
3. Growth Targeting
We assume that the objective of the central bank is to keep nominal income growth equal
to a (constant) target value ∆ﬂ z. Thus the central bank sets the interest rate it every
period so as to make ∆zt = ∆ﬂ z, where zt = xt + pt, with pt denoting (log) of the price
level and zt denoting (log) nominal GDP. In terms of in￿ation this implies
πt +xt −xt−1 = ∆ﬂ z (5)
Consequently, equation (5) will be satis￿ed if the central bank targets a constant growth
of GDP every period. Substituting (1) and (2) into (5) yields
(1 + λ)[−ϕ
‡
it − ￿ Etπt+1
·
+ ￿ Etxt+1 + gt]+β ￿ Etπt+1 + ut −xt−1 = ∆ﬂ z,
and solving this gives a rule for setting the interest rate it that will stabilize ∆zt at ∆ﬂ z.
This rule is given by





Plugging this rule (6) into equation (1) yields
(1 + λ)xt = −β ￿ Etπt+1 +xt−1 − ut + ∆ﬂ z (7)
Note that the interest elasticity of the IS equation (1), ϕ, does not appear in this reduced
form IS curve (7). We provide some intuition for this in section 4. For the time being, we
note that our complete system, under a policy of targeting a constant growth of nominal
GDP every period, is given by (7) and (2), representing the evolution of the endogenous
variables xt and πt, respectively.
3.1. Determinacy. Ball (1999) has argued that a monetary policy of nominal income
targeting would be destabilizing for output and in￿ation in the sense that there fails to ex-
ist a stationary equilibrium in this case. Svensson (1997) has also made similar arguments.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 6
However, as McCallum (1997a) has shown, this is a consequence of the backward looking
model that these authors use. In a model similar to the one presented here, McCallum
(1997a) has shown that this result can be reversed.1 I now show that under nominal
income targeting equilibrium is generically unique for all parameter con￿gurations.
In the model represented by equations (7) and (2), there is only one predetermined
endogenous variable xt−1. We can rewrite our system in matrix form as











































The matrix which is relevant for uniqueness is obtained by pre-multiplying the matrix
associated with the expectational variables on the right hand side with the inverse of the









We have two free endogenous variables, xt and πt, and one predetermined endogenous
variable, xt−1. Consequently, following Farmer (1991, 1999), we need exactly two of the
three eigenvalues of B0 to be inside the unit circle for uniqueness.
Proposition 1. Under nominal income growth targeting, equilibrium is generically unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In general, when the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument of the central
bank, determinacy of equilibrium can￿t be taken for granted. In fact the problem of
indeterminacy is particularly acute for simple Taylor type rules which respond to future
forecasts of output and in￿ation, that is, for rules of the form it = ϕx ￿ Etxt+1 +ϕπ ￿ Etπt+1
(see Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Bullard and Mitra (2000)). However, Proposition
1 shows that this need not be a problem with nominal income targeting even though such
1McCallum￿s (1997a) model is a special case of the model presented in section 2 in the sense that he
normalizes the discount factor β to be 1. In addition, I assume that the nominal interest rate is the policy
instrument instead of the real interest rate (as assumed by McCallum (1997a)) since in practice this is a
more realistic description of actual policy and it also facilitates the analysis of learning later on.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 7
a policy makes the interest rate rule, (6), forward looking. Ignoring the response of the
interest rate to the lagged output gap in (6), this can be understood as follows. Proposition
4 of Bullard and Mitra (2000) provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy
of equilibrium for rules of the form it = ϕx ￿ Etxt+1 + ϕπ ￿ Etπt+1. Roughly speaking, they
show that equilibrium is determinate in a similar model if ϕx is small enough and ϕπ
is more than one, corresponding to an active Taylor rule (the precise magnitudes for
determinacy depend on the structural parameters ϕ,λ, and β; see their Proposition 4).
A value of ϕπ more than one means that an increase in in￿ationary pressures causes the
nominal interest rate to rise enough to also raise the real interest rate, thereby, reducing
the output gap via the IS curve (1) and in￿ation via the AS curve (2). Even with a small
ϕx, one may have indeterminacy if either ϕπ is less than one, corresponding to a passive
Taylor rule, or if it is too large. It is interesting to observe that the response to ￿ Etπt+1
and ￿ Etxt+1 in rule (6) does satisfy the determinacy conditions of Proposition 4 of Bullard
and Mitra (2000). In other words, a policy of nominal GDP targeting forces the central
bank￿s response to ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1 to lie in the determinate region- the response to
￿ Etxt+1 is small enough and that to ￿ Etπt+1 is between 1 and 2 (i.e., it is aggressive but
not overly aggressive). Note that forward looking interest rate rules have been found
to describe the behavior of monetary policy in a number of industrialized countries (see
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998)). The analysis above shows that while the problem of
indeterminacy may be acute for ad hoc Taylor type forward looking rules, the situation is
quite diﬀerent for similar rules which are geared towards maintaining a constant growth
rate of GDP over time.
3.2. Learning. I now adapt methods developed by Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b)
and Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2000a) to understand how learning aﬀects these sys-
tems.2 I assume that the agents in the model no longer have rational expectations at the
outset. Instead, I replace expected values with adaptive rules, in which the agents form
2Some of the recent surveys of the literature on learning in macroeconomic models are Evans and
Honkapohja (1999, 2000a), Grandmont (1998), Marimon (1997), and Sargent (1993). A small sample of
the literature on learning speci￿cally related to monetary policy includes Bertocchi and Spagat (1993),
Ireland (1999), Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1998), and Barucci, Bischi, and Marimon (1998).Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 8
expectations using the data generated by the system in which they operate. We can imag-
ine the agents to use versions of recursive least squares updating. I use theorems due to
Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2000a) and calculate the conditions for expectational stabil-
ity (E-stability). Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) have shown that expectational stability,
a notional time concept, corresponds to stability under real-time adaptive learning under
quite general conditions. In particular, under E-stability of a rational expectations equi-
librium (REE), recursive least squares learning is locally convergent to that equilibrium.
We may assume that the fundamental disturbances have bounded support since equations
(1) and (2) arise out of local linearization of the original nonlinear model. Under this as-
sumption, if a REE is not E-stable, then the probability of convergence of the recursive
least squares algorithm to it is zero. Due to this one to one correspondence between the
expectational stability of a stationary REE and the stability under real-time adaptive
learning, I focus only on expectational stability conditions throughout the paper and the
terms ￿learnability,￿ ￿expectational stability,￿ and ￿stability in the learning dynamics￿
are all used interchangeably.
The analysis of learning is conducted under two diﬀerent formulations which corre-
spond to diﬀerent assumptions made about the behavior of private agents by the central
bank. In the ￿rst formulation, the central bank sets the interest rate in accordance with
the policy rule (6) recognizing that the private sector does not have rational expectations.
In other words, the interest rate rule is based directly on the subjective expectations of
agents and is called the contemporaneous expectations based policy rule.T h i s s e e m s t o
me to be the most realistic assumption to make on the part of the central bank. I also
discuss below ways in which such a policy can be implemented.
In the second formulation, the central bank (mistakenly) assumes that the private
sector has perfectly rational expectations at every point of time. This means that the
policy rule (6) is now based directly on the actual conditional expectations under RE
(that is, on Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 instead of ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1) and is called the rational
expectations (RE) based policy rule.3 While I believe this assumption is not entirely
3The terminology is borrowed from Evans and Honkapohja (2000b).Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 9
realistic, it does serve as a useful benchmark to judge how useful the assumption of
RE is as a guide for monetary policy in the long run. Another reason to study this
formulation is that Evans and Honkapohja (2000b) have recently shown that the use of
such an interest rate rule by the central bank in the conduct of optimal monetary policy
leads to instability of the REE for all structural parameter values. One would like to see
whether this instability result continues to be true when the central bank targets a given
growth rate of GDP every period.
Contemporaneous Expectations Based Policy Rule. I ￿rst turn to a discussion
of the contemporaneous expectations based policy rule. A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,i nt h i sf o r m u -
lation, I assume that the policy maker sets the nominal interest rate it in accordance with
the rule (6). This means that the central bank bases its policy on the lagged output gap,
the contemporaneous demand and cost push shocks as well as the subjective expectations
of private agents. In particular, we are assuming that the bank is able to observe private
sector expectations. Before turning to a formal discussion, I ￿rst discuss diﬀerent ways
of implementing this rule since it turns out to have desirable features from the point of
view of learnability. One may view the commercial forecasts published by various agencies
as being the expectations of the private sector. This is discussed extensively in Romer
and Romer (2000). These commercial forecasts are often created by ￿rms managing large
portfolios so that in a sense these are indeed the forecasts of market participants. It
is also the case that market participants often pay for these commercial forecasts; this
suggests that they view information processing as diﬃcult and commercial forecasts as
valuable. Given this scenario, it is plausible to assume that the private sector will just
adopt the commercial forecasts for their own use. Consequently, one way to implement
the proposal would be for the central bank to target the predictions of private sector
forecasts. This is discussed in Hall and Mankiw (1994). In the United States, there is a
published consensus of respected private forecasters, for instance, the Blue Chip Economic
Indicators. Around the ￿fth of each month, Blue Chip surveys economic forecasters at
approximately 50 banks, corporations, and consulting ￿rms and then produces a consen-
sus forecast which is a median of the individual forecasts. Romer and Romer (2000) alsoDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 10
discuss commercial forecasts prepared by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
currently being conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which is also
based on many commercial forecasts. A third source is commercial forecasts prepared
by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI).4 All in all, this shows that the interest rate rule (6)
represents a feasible way to implement monetary policy.
I now proceed step by step to show how the analysis of learning takes place under this
rule. I consider learning by private agents of the so called minimum state variable (MSV)
solution (see McCallum (1983)). The MSV solution for the model given by (7) and (2)
takes the following form:
xt = a1 + b1xt−1 + c1ut + d1gt (9)
πt = a2 + b2xt−1 + c2ut +d2gt (10)
where (a1,b 1,c 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2) are to be determined by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients.5 The MSV parameter values will be denoted by ﬂ a1, ﬂ b1 etc.. One computes
the expectation
￿ Etπt+1 = a2 +b2xt + c2ρut + d2￿gt (11)
Note that here we are assuming that the private sector is able to observe the contem-
poraneous output gap (and shocks) in forming its forecasts. We will have something to
say about this towards the end of the section. Inserting (11) into the reduced form IS
equation (7), one obtains
(1 + λ)xt = −β ￿ Etπt+1 +xt−1 − ut + ∆ﬂ z
= −β(a2 + b2xt +c2ρut + d2￿gt)+xt−1 − ut + ∆ﬂ z
= −βa2 + ∆ﬂ z −βb2xt −βc2ρut −βd2￿gt +xt−1 − ut
Solving for xt ￿nally yields the actual law of motion (ALM) for output as
xt =￿ a1 +￿ b1xt−1 +￿ c1ut + ￿ d1gt (12)
4See Romer and Romer (2000) for a more extensive discussion of these issues. Alternatively, as Evans
and Honkapohja (2000b) note, if the central bank knows the learning rules of private agents, it can infer
the expectations from other observed data.
5A c t u a l l y ,t h eM S Vs o l u t i o nw i l ln o td e p e n do nt h es h o c kgt,t h a ti s , ﬂ d1 = ﬂ d2 =0in the RE solution.
However, I keep this dependence to allow for generality in the analysis of learning later on.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 11
where
￿ a1 =( 1 + λ +βb2)
−1(∆ﬂ z − βa2) (13)
￿ b1 =( 1 + λ +βb2)−1 (14)
￿ c1 = −(1 + λ + βb2)−1(βc2ρ +1) (15)
￿ d1 = −(1 + λ + βb2)−1βd2￿ (16)
Similarly inserting (11) into the price adjustment equation (2), one can obtain the ALM
for in￿ation as
πt = λxt + β ￿ Etπt+1 +ut
= λxt + β(a2 + b2xt + c2ρut + d2￿gt)+ut
=( λ + βb2)xt + βa2 +( βc2ρ +1 ) ut + βd2￿gt
=( λ + βb2)(￿ a1 +￿ b1xt−1 +￿ c1ut + ￿ d1gt)+βa2 +( βc2ρ +1) ut +βd2￿gt
Collecting terms ￿nally gives the ALM for πt as
πt =￿ a2 +￿ b2xt−1 +￿ c2ut + ￿ d2gt (17)
where
￿ a2 =( λ + βb2)￿ a1 +βa2 (18)
￿ b2 =( λ + βb2)￿ b1 (19)
￿ c2 =( λ + βb2)￿ c1 +βc2ρ +1 (20)
￿ d2 =( λ + βb2)￿ d1 + βd2￿ (21)
The MSV solution is obtained by solving the set of simultaneous equations a1 =￿ a1,b 1 =
￿ b1,c 1 =￿ c1,d 1 = ￿ d1,a 2 =￿ a2,b 2 = ￿ b2,c 2 =￿ c2,d 2 = ￿ d2. As it turns out, for the analysis
of expectational stability, we only need to compute the MSV solutions for b1 and b2. The
two equations involving b1 and b2 (given by (14) and (19)) are independent from the rest
of the system and they can be solved to get two solutions for b2 given by
b–
2 =
β −λ −1 –
p
(1 + λ − β)2 +4 βλ
2β
(22)Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 12
Correspondingly, the solution for b
–




It is easy to see that b
−
2 (i.e. the solution corresponding to the negative sign outside the
square root in (22)) is negative, given our assumptions on the structural parameters, so
that b
−
1 > 1 rendering this solution non-stationary. Consequently, the unique stationary
solution corresponds to b
+
2 (henceforth, denoted by ﬂ b2). The corresponding value for b
+
1
(denoted by ﬂ b1)i sg i v e nb y
ﬂ b1 =
1+β + λ −
p




1+β + λ +
p
(1+ λ − β)2 +4βλ
(23)
and that for ﬂ b2 is given by
ﬂ b2 =1−ﬂ b1 (24)
Observe that 0 < ﬂ b1 < 1 and 0 < ﬂ b2 < 1.
For the analysis of learning we regard (9) and (10) as a perceived law of motion (PLM)
for the agents. Computing expectations, as before in (11), we obtain the corresponding
ALM for output and in￿ation in (12) and (17), respectively. We can then de￿ne a mapping
from the PLM to the ALM in the parameter space as
T(a1,b 1,c 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)=( ￿ a1,￿ b1,￿ c1, ￿ d1,￿ a2,￿ b2,￿ c2, ￿ d2) (25)
The T mapping gives rise to the diﬀerential equation de￿ning E-stability, namely
d
dτ
(a1,b 1,c 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)=T (a1,b 1,c 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)−
‡
￿ a1,￿ b1,￿ c1, ￿ d1,￿ a2,￿ b2,￿ c2, ￿ d2
·
The MSV solution corresponds to a ￿xed point of the T mapping and, hence, an equi-
librium of the diﬀerential equation. The equilibrium is said to expectationally stable
(E-stable) if it is a locally asymptotically stable point of the diﬀerential equation.
This model is merely a special case of the one treated in Evans and Honkapohja (1999,
2000a) and we now put our model in their formulation since it is easier to present ourDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 13
analytical results this way. For applying these results we ￿rst put the (reduced form)







(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z




0 −β(1 + λ)−1






(1 + λ)−1 0







−(1 + λ)−1 0






To shorten notation, we can write (26) in the form
yt = α +B ￿ Etyt+1 + δyt−1 + κwt (27)
where yt =[ xt,πt]




(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z





0 −β(1 + λ)−1





(1 + λ)−1 0






(1 + λ)−1 0
‚
(31)
which are the relevant matrices on the right hand side of (26). We also write wt =








The PLM of the agents takes the same form as the MSV solution given in (9) and (10)
and we write this in matrix form as
yt = a + byt−1 + cwt (33)













The corresponding ALM is given by (12) and (17) and we write this in matrix form as
yt =￿ a +￿ byt−1 +￿ cut (35)Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 14




￿ c1 ￿ d1
￿ c2 ￿ d2
‚
￿ b =




Note that the (unique) stationary MSV solution for b, ﬂ b, is given by the solution to the
system b = ￿ b with b and ￿ b being given by (34) and (36). This matrix ﬂ b is given by
ﬂ b =




where ﬂ b1 and ﬂ b2 are given by (23) and (24). Armed with this notation we are now in a
position to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose the time t information set is (1,y 0
t,w0
t)0. The MSV solution
under nominal income growth targeting is E-stable for all parameter values.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows that for all admissible values of the structural parameters the
relevant rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in this economy can be learnt by agents
using simple adaptive learning rules. Some intuition can be provided for this result.
In the context of ad hoc Taylor type rules, Bullard and Mitra (2000) have shown that
expectational stability of the REE depends on the structural parameters of the economy as
well as the policy parameters of the central bank. In particular, Proposition 5 of Bullard
and Mitra (2000) shows that, for simple Taylor rules which respond to ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1,
there is expectational stability if the response to ￿ Etπt+1 is more than one (and that to
￿ Etxt+1 is positive) whereas there is real danger of expectational instability if the response
to ￿ Etπt+1 is less than one. The interest rule (6) shows that a policy of targeting the growth
rate of nominal GDP calls for the interest rate to respond to ￿ Etπt+1 with a coeﬃcient
bigger than one, thereby, contributing to stability under learning dynamics. This means
that a deviation of ￿ Etπt+1 above its RE value calls for a rise in the real interest rate which
reduces xt via the IS curve (1) and πt via the in￿a t i o ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) .T h i si nt u r nr e d u c e s
￿ Etπt+1, thereby, driving the economy towards the initial equilibrium. Similarly, the rule
(6) tightens monetary policy when ￿ Etxt+1 r i s e sa b o v ei t sR Ev a l u e .Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 15
In Proposition 2, we have assumed that the private sector and the central bank have
information on contemporaneous dated variables (like the output gap) in formulating their
forecasts. However, several authors, like McCallum (1993, 1997b, 1999), are especially
critical of this assumption since information on the current period output gap is rarely
available when the bank (or the private sector) makes a decision. An alternative, suggested
by McCallum (1993, 1997b, 1999), would be to assume that the private sector and the
bank base their actions only on the last period￿s information, i.e. on the last quarter￿s
output gap. Even with this more realistic information structure, it is possible to show
that the rational expectations equilibrium continues to be learnable. The result about
learnability of equilibrium is, therefore, quite robust to diﬀerent assumptions made about
the information structure.
Before concluding this section, we point out some assumptions made (implicitly) in the
analysis of stability. The forecasts of agents under learning, given by (11), were directly
incorporated in the model- therefore, it is implicitly assumed that the Euler equations
represent behavioral rules which describe how private agents respond to their forecasts.
In particular, agents respond only to expectations about next period variables and not
to expectations further out in the future. This enables us to write the model in a linear
setup and use the results of Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2000a). In addition, the private
sector, being monopolistically competitive, is assumed to be populated by large number
of ￿small￿ agents- strategic behavior in expectations formation and learning is absent.
Finally, the central bank is implicitly assumed to have knowledge of the true structure
of the economy (given by (1) and (2)) as well as the key structural parameter values β,
λ, and ϕ since it makes use of rule (6) in setting the interest rate. I believe this serves
as a reasonable ￿rst approximation and, as we have seen, yields a very strong result on
the learnability of the REE solution. In addition, if the bank follows the rule (6) with
parameters deviating from the speci￿ed values by small amounts, then the economy will
converge over time to an equilibrium which deviates from the REE by small amounts. I
also conjecture that the results on E-stability will be unaltered if the central bank does
not have knowledge of the key structural parameters λ and ϕ and is instead learning aboutDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 16
them using least squares, as do the private agents.6
It is, however, important that the central bank recognize that expectations of the pri-
vate sector need not be fully rational during the transition to REE and set the interest
rate accordingly. If the central bank mistakenly assumes that agents have rational ex-
pectations during the transition and sets the interest rate accordingly then it no longer
follows that the MSV solution will be expectationally stable, as we now show in the next
section.
Rational Expectations (RE) Based Policy Rule. We now assume that the cen-
tral bank continues to have knowledge of the true structure of the economy as well as the
structural parameters. However, it mistakenly assumes that the private sector has RE at
every point of time. Recall that the interest rule given by (6) responds directly to the
expectations of the private sector. If the central bank assumes that the private sector has
RE at every point of time, then it will use the actual conditional expectations, Etπt+1
and Etxt+1, in the rule (6) instead of the subjective expectations, ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1.
Such an interest rate rule is called the RE based policy rule.
The structure of the economy is still given by (1), (2), and (6). We can show that
there exists an MSV solution of the form
xt = a1 + b1xt−1 + c1ut + d1gt (38)
πt = a2 + b2xt−1 + c2ut +d2gt (39)
where (a1,b 1,c 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2) are to be determined by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. One computes
￿ Etxt+1 = a1 +b1xt + c1ρut +d1￿gt (40)
￿ Etπt+1 = a2 +b2xt + c2ρut + d2￿gt (41)
where we have assumed, as before, that the private sector is able to observe the contem-
poraneous output gap in formulating its forecasts. Inserting into (1), (2), and (6) one
6The basis for this conjecture is that in the analysis of E-stability of optimal monetary policy, Evans
and Honkapohja (2000b) show that the results on E-stability are unaﬀected by such simultaneous learning
by the central bank and the private sector. Replicating the arguments in the appendix of their paper
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obtains, as before, the MSV values (ﬂ a1,ﬂ b1,ﬂ c1, ﬂ d1,ﬂ a2,ﬂ b2,ﬂ c2, ﬂ d2). The corresponding interest
rate rule under RE can be computed from (6) as7
it = {1+βϕ−1(1 + λ)−1}Etπt+1 +ϕ−1Etxt+1 −ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1xt−1 +ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1ut
+ϕ−1gt − ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z
= {1+βϕ−1(1 + λ)−1}(ﬂ a2 +ﬂ b2xt +ﬂ c2ρut + ﬂ d2￿gt)+ϕ−1(ﬂ a1 +ﬂ b1xt +ﬂ c1ρut + ﬂ d1￿gt)
−ϕ−1(1+λ)−1xt−1 + ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1ut + ϕ−1gt − ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z
Note that unlike the contemporaneous expectations based policy rule which was based
on the subjective expectations of in￿ation and output, we have now plugged the RE
parameter values to get the actual conditional expectations in deriving the RE based
p o l i c yr u l e .T h i si st h ek e yd i ﬀerence between the two policy rules. On simpli￿cation, the
RE based policy rule is given by
it = ψ0 + ψxxt −ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1xt−1 + ψuut +ψggt (42)
where
ψ0 = {1+βϕ−1(1 + λ)−1}ﬂ a2 + ϕ−1ﬂ a1 − ϕ−1(1+λ)−1∆ﬂ z,
ψx = {1+βϕ
−1(1 + λ)
−1}ﬂ b2 + ϕ
−1ﬂ b1,




−1 ﬂ d1￿ +ϕ
−1.
We now plug the rule (42) into (1) to get
xt = −ϕ[ψ0 + ψxxt −ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1xt−1 +ψuut + ψggt]+ϕ ￿ Etπt+1 + ￿ Etxt+1 +gt
or rearranging terms we get the evolution of output as
(1+ϕψx)xt = −ϕ[ψ0−ϕ−1(1+λ)−1xt−1+ψuut]+ϕ ￿ Etπt+1+ ￿ Etxt+1+(1−ϕψg)gt (43)
W ec a nt h e ng e tt h ee v o l u t i o no fi n ￿ation from (2) as
πt =[ β +λϕ(1 + ϕψx)−1] ￿ Etπt+1 + λ(1 + ϕψx)−1 ￿ Etxt+1 +λ(1 + λ)−1(1 + ϕψx)−1xt−1
[1 −λϕψu(1 + ϕψx)−1]ut +λ(1 + ϕψx)−1(1 −ϕψg)gt (44)
7The explicit values for (ﬂ a1,ﬂ b1, ﬂ c1, ﬂ d1,ﬂ a2,ﬂ b2,ﬂ c2, ﬂ d2) are not needed here. Later on, however, we will
need the explicit values for ﬂ b1 and ﬂ b2 for computing expectational stability.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 18
Note that the actual evolution of output and in￿ation during the transition to rational
expectations (obviously) still depends on the subjective expectations of agents as shown
by (43) and (44). We can put (43) and (44) in matrix form as
yt = α1 +B1 ￿ Etyt+1 + δ1yt−1 +κ1wt (45)
where yt =[ xt,πt]




(1 + ϕψx)−1 ϕ(1 + ϕψx)−1





(1 + λ)−1(1 + ϕψx)−1 0
λ(1 + λ)−1(1 + ϕψx)−1 0
‚
(47)
with the forms of α1 and κ1 being omitted since they are not needed in what follows.
For the analysis of learning, we regard (38) and (39) as the PLM of the agents with
corresponding forecasts given by (40) and (41). Plugging the interest rate rule (42) into
(1) and (2) and simplifying yields
xt =( 1 + ϕψx − ϕb2 −b1)
−1[a1 +ϕa2 − ϕψ0 +( 1+λ)
−1xt−1 +( ϕc2ρ+ c1ρ − ϕψu)ut +
(ϕd2￿ +d1￿ +1− ϕψg)gt] (48)
and
πt =( λ +βb2)xt + βa2 +( βc2ρ +1) ut +βd2￿gt (49)
After plugging in the value of xt from (48) into (49), we can de￿ne a map from the
PLM, (38) and (39), to the ALM, (48) and (49), and the ￿xed points of this map give
us the MSV values (ﬂ a1,ﬂ b1,ﬂ c1, ﬂ d1,ﬂ a2,ﬂ b2,ﬂ c2, ﬂ d2). For the analysis of E-stability we need
ﬂ b1 and ﬂ b2 which can be shown to be still given by (23), and (24). The MSV solution
(ﬂ a1,ﬂ b1,ﬂ c1, ﬂ d1,ﬂ a2,ﬂ b2,ﬂ c2, ﬂ d2) is E-stable if the eigenvalues of all of the following matrices
(I − B1ﬂ b)−1B1,
[(I −B1ﬂ b)−1δ1]0 ⊗[(I −B1ﬂ b)−1B1],
Φ0 ⊗ (I − B1ﬂ b)−1B1
have real parts less than 1 where B1, δ1, Φ, and ﬂ b are given by (46), (47), (32), and (37),
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quite complicated and analytical results do not seem possible. However, we can at least
check E-stability for plausible values of structural parameters. The calibrated parameter
values for the U.S. economy in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) are ϕ =1 ,β = .99,λ =
.3,￿= ρ = .9. With these values, the REE is expectationally unstable. A similar situation
prevails if we use the structural values in Woodford (1999) for the U.S. economy, namely
ϕ =( .157)−1 ’ 6.37,β = .99,λ = .024. Even with some other values of structural
parameters, we get instability so that this result seems quite robust.
This result is similar in ￿avor to the one obtained in Evans and Honkapohja (2000b)
where it was shown that the optimal monetary policy rule was unstable for all parameter
values when the central bank (mistakenly) assumes RE at every point of time for the
private sector. In this model too if the central bank targets a nominal variable like GDP
and assumes that agents have RE, then it is quite likely that the REE outcome will not
emerge as the long-run outcome of the economy. Some intuition for this is as follows. A
deviation of ￿ Etπt+1 above its RE value leads, through the reduced form IS curve, (43),
to an increase in xt (recall that from (42), ψx > 0 since ﬂ b1 and ﬂ b2 > 0) and, through the
aggregate supply equation, to an increase in πt. Over time this leads to upward revisions
of both ￿ Etπt+1 and ￿ Etxt+1. T h e r ei sn o t h i n gi nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l e( 4 2 )t oo ﬀset this
tendency and, over time, the economy moves further away from the REE. It is also
quite instructive here to compare the reduced form IS curves under the contemporaneous
expectations based policy rule, (7), with that under the RE based policy rule, (43). In
the former case, a rise in ￿ Etπt+1 a b o v ei t sR Ev a l u ec a u s e sadecrease in xt (and hence
πt) pushing the economy back towards the REE whereas in the latter case, the same
deviation causes an increase in xt and πt, pushing the economy further away from the
REE. I think this is the key to obtaining stability under the contemporaneous expectations
based policy rule and instability under the RE based policy rule. The instability result is
reminiscent of Howitt￿s (1992) warning about the assumption of RE leading to misleading
results in monetary models. It also points to the importance of targeting the observable
expectations of the private sector on the part of the central bank in formulating its interest
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4. Endogenous Inflation and Output Persistence
A basic problem with the model given by (1) and (2) is that it is entirely forward looking.
The only backward looking element that enters the model is through the monetary policy
of targeting the growth rate of GDP, namely, via the lagged output gap. As a result,
this speci￿cation has diﬃculty capturing the inertia in output and in￿ation evident in
the data (see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b), Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999)). Consequently, we now look at a model considered in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler




it − ￿ Etπt+1
·
+( 1− θ) ￿ Etxt+1 + θxt−1 +gt (50)
πt = λxt +( 1− φ)β ￿ Etπt+1 + φπt−1 + ut (51)
The parameters θ and φ capture the inertia in output and in￿ation, respectively, and
a r ea s s u m e dt ob eb e t w e e n0 and 1. The shocks gt and ut are still assumed to follow
the processes (3) and (4). The central bank continues to target the growth rate of GDP
so that equation (5) still applies. Substituting (50) and (51) into (5) yields the implied
interest rate it that will stabilize ∆zt at ∆ﬂ z. This rule is given by
it = {1+βϕ−1(1 + λ)−1(1 −φ)} ￿ Etπt+1 + ϕ−1(1−θ) ￿ Etxt+1 +{θϕ−1 −ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1}xt−1
+φϕ−1(1 + λ)−1πt−1 + ϕ−1(1+λ)−1ut +ϕ−1gt − ϕ−1(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z (52)
Note that we are now assuming that the central bank uses the contemporaneous expec-
tations based policy rule. Plugging the above rule into equation (50) yields
xt = −β(1+λ)−1(1−φ) ￿ Etπt+1+(1+λ)−1xt−1−φ(1+λ)−1πt−1−(1+λ)−1ut+(1+λ)−1∆ﬂ z
(53)
We can then get the reduced form of the price adjustment equation by substituting (53)
into (51). This gives us
πt = β(1 − φ){1 −λ(1 + λ)
−1} ￿ Etπt+1 +λ(1 + λ)
−1xt−1 + φ{1 − λ(1 + λ)
−1}πt−1
+{1 −λ(1+ λ)−1}ut + λ(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z (54)Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 21
Thus, our complete system is now given by (53) and (54), representing the evolution







(1 + λ)−1∆ﬂ z




0 −β(1 + λ)−1(1 − φ)






(1 + λ)−1 −φ(1 + λ)−1











To shorten notation again, we can write (55) in the form
yt = α2 + B2 ￿ Etyt+1 + δ2yt−1 + κ2wt.
where yt =[ xt,πt]




0 −β(1 + λ)−1(1 − φ)





(1+λ)−1 −φ(1 + λ)−1
λ(1 + λ)−1 φ(1+λ)−1
‚
(57)
We can immediately make one observation from the system (55). The IS equation
parameters, ϕ and θ, do not enter (55). This generalizes a similar conclusion obtained in
section 3. One can understand this phenomenon by getting the reduced form IS equation
in a slightly diﬀerent manner. Equation (5) may be rewritten as
πt +xt = xt−1 + ∆ﬂ z (58)
If we now substitute the equation for in￿ation (51) into (58) we get
(1 + λ)xt + β(1 − φ) ￿ Etπt+1 + φπt−1 +ut = xt−1 + ∆ﬂ z (59)
After rearranging it can be seen that this is exactly the reduced form IS equation (53)
obtained above, after substituting the interest rate rule (52) into the original IS equation
(50). The central bank does not have direct control over expected in￿ation ￿ Etπt+1 and
in￿ation πt. The interest rate only allows the bank to control directly the demand xt
and through it πt. The evolution of the growth rate of nominal GDP, on the other hand,
depends directly on the evolution of ￿ Etπt+1 as well as the cost push shock ut and πt,a s
must be clear from (58) or (59). Consequently, even though the bank is able to oﬀset
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rate of GDP, through suitable control of the interest rate (namely, via the rule (52)), it
is unable to do the same as far as the parameters of the aggregate supply equation, (51),
are concerned. In particular, the discount factor of the suppliers, β, the persistence in
in￿ation, φ, and the degree of price stickiness, λ, continue to aﬀect the growth rate of
GDP under a policy of GDP targeting.
We have seen that even though output inertia does not matter for uniqueness and
learnability of equilibrium, in￿ation inertia could still potentially matter. For considering
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Since there are now two free and two pre-determined endogenous variables, we need exactly
2 eigenvalues of J to be inside the unit circle for the existence of a unique equilibrium.
Unfortunately, analytical results on determinacy do not seem possible any more.8
For analyzing the E-stability of equilibrium, we proceed as before. The MSV solutions
of the system (55) take the form
yt = a + byt−1 + cut (60)
where yt =( xt,πt)0. The MSV solution for b, ﬂ b, is given by solving the matrix quadratic
B2b2 − b +δ2 =0
8When φ =1 , it is possible to show that there are two zero eigenvalues and two complex conjugate
eigenvalues with absolute value more than 1; so we have determinacy in this case. By continuity, the
same must be true for values of φ close to 1. A policy of nominal GDP targeting, therefore, does not cause
explosive instrument instability even with high levels of in￿ation (and output) inertia.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 23
where B2 and δ2 are given by (56) and (57). For E-stability, we assume that agents
have a PLM of the form (60) which leads to an ALM of a similar form. Solving the ￿xed
points of this map will give us the REE solutions which can then be checked for E-stability.
Unfortunately, yet again, analytical conditions for E-stability are not available.9 However,
we can still check E-stability numerically for plausible parameter values. For example, we
may use the calibrated parameter values for the U.S. economy in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) (see section 3). We also set φ = .71, which is the value estimated in Rudebusch
(2000). The matrix J then has the eigenvalues {0,.23,1.09 + .74I,1.09 − .74I} so that






and using Proposition 10.3 of Evans and Honkapohja (2000, Ch. 10) it can be checked
that the MSV solution (ﬂ a,ﬂ b, ﬂ c) is E-stable since all the matrices required for checking this
Proposition have real eigenvalues, with the maximal one being .23. Experimenting with
some other values of φ, we continue to ￿nd that there exists a unique stationary MSV
solution which is E-stable. We get the same conclusions if we use Woodford￿s (1999)
parameter values for the U.S. economy. Note that these results are to be expected given
our previous experience with the basic model in section 3 since the interest rule (52)
continues to satisfy the ￿Taylor principle￿- it reacts to ￿ Etπt+1 with a coeﬃcient bigger
than one and to ￿ Etxt+1 with a positive coeﬃcient. Observe also that there continues to
be a negative relationship between ￿ Etπt+1 and xt in the reduced form IS curve (53).
5. Conclusions
A monetary policy of targeting nominal GDP has been advocated by economists for
almost two decades now. However, most of the theoretical and empirical defence has
taken place in the context of ad hoc macroeconomic models. Not much is known about
the theoretical behavior of such a policy in models with explicit micro-foundations which
are currently being used to give advice to policy makers. In this paper I have shown that
9If φ =1 , then B2 in (56) becomes the null matrix and it is easy to see then that the MSV solution
is E-stable. Thus, with a high degree of persistence in in￿ation and output, we have a determinate
equilibrium which is stable under learning dynamics.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 24
such a policy generically leads to a determinate equilibrium in the context of a standard
forward looking model which is currently the workhorse for the theoretical analysis of
monetary policy- there are no problems of encountering unexpected volatility in in￿ation
and output if a central bank follows such a policy. This is an important consideration
since it is well known now that monetary policy rules where the nominal interest rate
responds to deviations of in￿ation and output from target levels (Taylor type rules) may
easily lead to indeterminate equilibria (Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Bullard and
Mitra (2000)).
I have gone further than merely analyzing the determinacy of REE under a policy
of targeting nominal GDP. It is recognized by a number of economists now that the
assumption of rational expectations on the part of private agents is unusually strong.
Consequently, I have studied the stability of these macroeconomic systems under learning
using methods developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2000a). In general, determi-
nacy alone is insuﬃcient to induce learnability of a REE in such models. This has been
recently shown in Bullard and Mitra (2000) in the context of Taylor type rules.
However, in the context of nominal GDP targeting, I ￿nd that determinate equilibria
are indeed learnable, even when account is taken of endogenous in￿ation and output
persistence in the model.10 This is especially heartening since policy rules which lead to
unlearnable equilibria are to be avoided. I think this is reasonable since we have already
endowed agents with quite a bit of information about the economy in the formulation of
adaptive learning in the sense that the perceived law of motion of the agents corresponds to
the MSV solution. The agents have the right variables and the right relationship between
the variables, as well as initial conditions in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. If agents
are unable to learn the MSV solution even under this very favorable assumption, then they
are unlikely to learn the equilibrium under more general assumptions.11 Consequently,
10To economize on space, I have only presented the case of the bank targeting a given growth rate of
nominal GDP. Some authors like Hall and Mankiw (1994) have, however, advocated a policy of targeting
the level of GDP. It can be shown that the results obtained for determinacy and learnability also carry
over to the case of level targeting, that is, equilibrium is generically unique and E-stable for all possible
parametrizations of the model.
11An analogy I have in mind are the notions of weak and strong E-stability used in the learning
literature. If a certain equilibrium is not weakly E-stable, then it cannot be strongly E-stable.Desirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 25
learnability of MSV solutions under a particular policy rule should be taken as a minimal
requirement in monetary models before being advocated to policy makers.
We have also seen that it may be dangerous for central banks to assume RE on the
part of the private agents at every point of time- the economy may diverge from the
REE in this case. The central bank should instead base the interest rate directly on the
expectations of private agents; something which has been emphasized in Hall and Mankiw
(1994). This type of policy rule is conducive to agents being able to coordinate on the
unique equilibrium of the economy. This positive result provides an additional argument
in favor of nominal GDP targeting and reinforces the views of economists in favor of
such a monetary policy. It also provides some support to the announced ECB strategy of
monetary targeting.
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A . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
From the structure of B0 (given by (8)) it is evident that one of the eigenvalues is zero.





with the following characteristic polynomial
p(φ)=φ
2 −(1+β +λ)φ +β
Note that p(0) = β > 0 and p(1) = −λ < 0 so that one of these eigenvalues is between 0
and 1 and the other is more than 1 (by exploiting the continuity of p(φ) in φ). This shows
that exactly 2 eigenvalues of B0 are inside the unit circle or that equilibrium is unique.
B . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We have spelled out the PLM, the ALM, and the T map from the PLM to the ALM in
equations (33), (35), and (25), respectively. As we noted, our model is merely a special
case of the one treated in Evans and Honkapohja (2000, ch. 10). Consequently, we
can apply their results (in particular Proposition 10.3) directly here. The MSV solution
(ﬂ a1,ﬂ b1,ﬂ c1, ﬂ d1,ﬂ a2,ﬂ b2,ﬂ c2, ﬂ d2) is E-stable if the eigenvalues of all of the following matrices
(I − Bﬂ b)
−1B
[(I − Bﬂ b)−1δ]0 ⊗ [(I − Bﬂ b)−1B]
Φ0 ⊗ (I −Bﬂ b)−1B
have real parts less than one. Recall that the matrices B,δ, Φ, andﬂ b are given, respectively,
by (29), (30), (32) and (37). The eigenvalues of (I − Bﬂ b)−1B can be shown to be 0 and
γ =
2β
1+β + λ +
p
(1 + λ − β)2 +4βλ
= βﬂ b1 < 1
where ﬂ b1 is given by (23) and is between 0 and 1. The eigenvalues of Φ0 ⊗ (I − Bﬂ b)−1B
are given by 0,0,ργ and ￿γ (by the properties of kronecker products) which are again
less than one by our assumptions on ρ and ￿. Finally, it can be shown that three of theDesirability Of Nominal GDP Targeting Under Adaptive Learning 29
eigenvalues of [(I − Bﬂ b)−1δ]0 ⊗ [(I − Bﬂ b)−1B] are 0 and the only non-zero eigenvalue is
given by
4β
[1 + β + λ +
p
(1+λ − β)2 +4βλ]2 = βﬂ b2
1 < 1
This proves E-stability of the MSV solution."July 3, 2001";
"DESIRABILITY OF NOMINAL GDP TARGETING UNDER ADAPTIVE LEARNING";
"PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2";
Clear@β, δ, λ, ρ, µ, B, phi, bbar, b1bar, b2bar, A1, A2, DTa, DTb, DTcD
"The Mathematica routine below computes
eigenvalues of the matrices required for checking E−stability";
"See Proposition 10.3 of Evans−Honkapohja H2001L";
"B matrix below";
B = 880, −βêH1 +λ L<, 80, βêH1 +λ L<<;
"δ matrix below";
δ=881êH1 +λ L,0 <, 8λêH1 +λ L,0 <<;
"phi matrix below";
phi = 88ρ,0 <, 80, µ<<;
"bbar matrix below";
"b1bar=2êH1+β+λ+Sqrt@H1+λ−βL^2+4∗β∗λDL";
"Note that the value of b1bar is not needed below for the proof";
b2bar = 1 − b1bar;
bbar = 88b1bar, 0<, 8b2bar, 0<<;
"The function 'kronecker' defines how to compute the
kronecker product of 2 matrices p and q with f taken to be 'Times'";
kronecker@f_, p_List, q_ListD :=
Flatten@Map@Flatten, Transpose@Outer@f, p, qD, 81, 3, 2<D, 82<D,1 D;
"Matrices for checking EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY";
A1 = Transpose@Inverse@IdentityMatrix@2D − B. bbarD.δD;
A2 = Inverse@IdentityMatrix@2D − B.bbarD.B;
"Eigenvalues of DTa";
DTa = Inverse@IdentityMatrix@2D − B. bbarD.B;
Simplify@Eigenvalues@DTaDD
"Eigenvalues of DTb";
DTb = kronecker@Times, A1, A2D;
Simplify@Eigenvalues@DTbDD
"Eigenvalues of DTc";









                                                              
H1 +β−b1bar β+λ L2 =
90, 0,
βµ




                                                     
1 +β−b1bar β+λ
=
eigenvalues.nb 1